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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE COURTS
VERN CoUNTRYMAN
(continued)*
PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER
The cases discussed in the preceding section dealt with adversary or
cooperative methods of competitors inter se. The primary purpose of
the business practices there considered was to decrease or eliminate
competition, either by predatory methods calculated to weaken or de-
stroy the competitor, or by mutual efforts designed to remove the emu-
lative factor.
The business tactics considered in this section are of a different
character. They have as their primary purpose the promotion of sales
and their direct incidence is upon the consumer rather than upon the
competitor. They are methods of competition only in the sense that
they are used to increase the amount of business done, and thus to im-
prove the relative position among competitors.
But it is as methods of competition that they were brought within
the jurisdiction of the Commission under Section 5 of the F. T. C.
Act. Although the Wheeler-Lea amendment' to Section 5 in 1938 added
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to the business conduct within
the Commission's jurisdiction, that amendment has not yet been con-
strued to make any appreciable extension of the authority derived
from the original terms of Section 5.
True, the case law relating to the Commission's power to prosecute
for misrepresentation has been rendered obsolete to a great extent,
insofar as advertising of "food, drugs, devices or cosmetics" is con-
cerned, by another provision of the Wheeler-Lea Act expressly declar-
ing false advertising (defined as advertising, other than labeling,
"which is misleading in a material respect") to be an unfair or deceptive
act or practice within the meaning of the amendment to Section 5. 2
And the law of a few other decisions under Section 5 has been replaced
by the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1940,8 which defines the mis-
branding of wool products or the removal or mutilation of a label
to be both an unfair method of competition and an unfair and de-
ceptive act or practice under Section 5. A wool product is misbranded,
within the meaning of this Act, "if it is falsely or deceptively stamped,
tagged, labeled or otherwise identified," or if certain information as
*The first installment of this article appears at 17 WAsH. L. REv. 1.152 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1939).
252 STAT. 114 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §§ 52-58 (Supp. 1939). The statute also
authorizes the Commission to secure a temporary injunction pending ac-'
tion under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act. Such action may be taken even
before a complaint has issued under Section 5. F. T. C. v. Thomsen-King
& Co., 109 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
354 STAT. 1128 (1940). This statute also provides for preliminary action
by injunction, similar to that authorized in the false advertising cases.
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to the product and the manufacturer thereof is not affixed to the prod-
uct. But the first statute will not apply to misrepresentations on labels,
brands, trademarks, etc.,4 and the second statute covers too narrow a
field to work any fundamental change in the principles herein discussed.
The practices here considered fall into three general classes: (1)
inducing purchases by misrepresentation of various matters, (2) induc-
ing purchases by the use of gaming methods, and (3) inducing pur-
chases by commercial bribery. Some of them have been held to be
unfair methods because of the injury to competitors, although the
nature and extent of this injury has not been clearely defined. Others
have been declared unfair methods-after some hesitation-because of
the injury to the consumer. Certainly the principal effect of many of
the cases is to afford protection to the consumer. But it is not suggested
that this is any reason for concluding that the Commission or the
courts have erred in determining that the practices condemned are
unfair methods of competition-these cases merely involve a concept
of unfair competitive methods which is different from that upon which
the cases in the preceding section were based.
Misrepresentation of Nature or Ingredients
The Supreme Court set the judicial approach for cases involving mis-
representation as to the nature or ingredients of the product in F. T. C.
v. Winsted Hosiery Co.5 There it was held to be an unfair method
to brand part-wool underwear as "Merino," "Wool" or "Worsted"
where the public understood these terms to mean that the product
so branded was 100 per cent wool. This was an unfair method of com-
petition, said Mr. justice Brandeis, because when misbranded goods
attract customers by fraud, trade is diverted from honest producers.
The Circuit Courts followed the rationale of this case, placing the
emphasis on injury to competitors, in sustaining Commission orders
against representations which carried a false connotation as to the
nature or ingredients of the product,6 and against express misrepresen-
tation of nature or ingredients.7
' See M. Handler, The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-
Lea Act (1939) 6 LAw & CONTMIP. PROB. 91, wherein are indicated the less
obvious defects of the statute.
258 U. S. 483 (1922).
8F. T. C. v. Morissey, 47 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); F. T. C. v.
Good-Grape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); F. T. C. v. Cassoff, 38
F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); N. Fluegelman & Co. v. F. T. C., 37 F. (2d)
59 (C. C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Masland Duraleather Co. v. F. T. C., 34 F. (2d) 733
(C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. F. T. C., 11 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A.
6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 718 (1926). Cf. Ostermoor & Co. v. F. T. C.,
16 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), holding that a pictoral expansion of
filler when a completed mattress is partially opened is not an unfair
method.
7F. T. C. v. Non-Plate Engraving Co., 49 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
F. T. C. v. Kay, 35 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), cert. denied, 2&1 U. S. 764
(1930); Guaranty Veterinary Co. v. F. T. C., 285 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922).
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The lower courts have also spelled out certain limitations of the
proposition. If the representation is not palpably false, but merely
states as an established fact something which is actually a matter of
honest dispute, there is no violation of Section 5.1 And if the nature
of the misrepresentation is not such that "the inherent tendency and
opportunity" indicates that the public will be deceived, the Commission
must introduce evidence to prove actual deception.'
And popular usage and understanding may afford a basis either for
justifying or for condemning the practice. Thus, where the word
"Castile" no longer has its original meaning as a soap containing 100
per cent pure olive oil as its oil base, it is not an unfair method to use
the term to describe soap with a different oil base.1° ' But where re-
spondent has sold a high quality baking powder for 60 years, it cannot
change to a lower grade and sell it under the same trade name and
in the same container. 1
The rule of the Winsted case has also been applied to condemn the
practice of re-issuing old moving pictures under new titles.12
In 1934 the Algoma case" reached the Supreme Court and a new
approach was suggested. The court held that it was a violation of
Section 5 to sell a species of yellow pine as "California white pine"
and Mr. Justice Cardozo announced that, regardless-of the comparative
value of respondents' product and genuine California white pine:
"The consumer is prejudiced if, upon giving an order for one
thing, he. is supplied with something else . . . . In such
matters, the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though
the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or per-
haps by ignorance."
8L. B. Silver Co. v. F. T. C., 289 Fed. 985 (C. C. A- 6th, 1923). Respond-
ent advertised that its "Ohio Improved Chester" hogs were a separate
breed from "Chester White" hogs, although expert breeders disagreed on
the point
0 Ohio Leather Co. v. F. T. C., 45 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ("Kaffor-
Kid" used as name of leather other than kid); Berkey & Gay Furniture Co.
v. F. T. C., 42 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) (veneer furniture sold as
"walnut" and "mahogany"). And see Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v.
F. T. C., 26 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), where the Commission con-
sented to the setting aside of its order forbidding the use of the term
"Philippine Mahogany" to describe a wood which was not mahogany.
This case is criticized by former Commissioner A. F. Meyers in FEDaAL
Arir-TRUST LAWS, A SYMPosIUM AT COLUMVBIA (1932), 133.
With Arnold Stone Co. v. F. T. C., 49 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931),
'holding that there was no deception of the public where architects, con-
tractors and builders-the only customers of respondent-knew that his
"pink marble" was actually artificial stone, compare Marietta Mfg. Co. v.
F. T. C., 50 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), where, on similar facts, the
court went further and considered the possibility of deception of con-
sumers employing the architects, contractors and builders.
20 James S. Kirk & Co. v. F. T. C., 59 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
"I Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F. T. C., 281 Fed. 744 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
"Fox Film Corp. v. F. T. C. 296 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
'F. T. C. v. Algoma Lbr. Co., 291 U. S. 67, 78 (1934). The opinion
relies upon F. T. C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212 (1933), discussed
at p. 90, infra.
1942]
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True., this decision does not amount to a holding that injury to the
consumer, without more, is an unfair method of competition. Justice
Cardozo added:
"Nor is the prejudice only to the consumer. Dealers and
manufacturers are prejudiced when orders that would have
come to them if the lumber had been rightly named, are di-
verted to others whose methods are less scrupulous."
But, despite this deference to traditional rationale, it is submitted
that the Algoma case evinces at least a new awareness of the scope of
Section 5 in misrepresentation cases-an .awareness which would seem
conducive to a more liberal construction of the statute than would
be likely if the inquiry were directed solely to the effect of a given
trade practice upon competitors, without any regard to its effect upon
consumers.
Subsequent decisions in the lower courts reflect, at least in their
language, the broader approach of the Algoma case. 14 Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit has decided that the ignorance of the respondent as to the
falsity of his representations is immaterial, because "The purpose of
the statute is protection of the public, not punishment of a wrong-
doer." 5 But, unless his case indicates that the respondent will be
held to a higher standard of conduct for the protection of the con-
suming public than would be imposed if the only concern were for the
protection of competitors, the change in approach does not appear to
have produced any change in results.
Nor is there any evidence in the cases that the Wheeler-Lea amend-
ment has affected the situation. Of course, the amendment will have
no application to cases which have already been defined as unfair
methods of competition, but it may in the future be used to sustain
prosecution of methods which could not have been condemned under
the terms of the original act.
Misrepresentation of Performance
Similar to the cases involving misrepresentation as to the nature
and ingredients of the product are those concerning misrepresentations
as to its performance. But in F. T. C. v. Raladam Co.,' the. earliest
of these cases to be subjected to judicial review, the Supreme Court
set aside an order directing the respondent to cease advertising that
its "obesity cure" could be used by the purchaser without harmful
1" Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. F. T. C., 113 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
Century Metalcraft Corp. v. F. T. C., 112 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
H. N. Heusner & Son v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
Elmoro Cigar Co. v. F. T. C., 107 F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); Sheffield
Silver Co. v. F. T. C., 98 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); National Silver
Co. v. F. T. C., 88 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); F. T. C. v. Hines Turner
Glass Co., 81 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A., 3d, 1935); F. T. C. v. Artloom Corp., 69
F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
'1 Gimbel Bros. v. F. T. C., 116 F. (2d) 578, 579 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
16283 U. S. 643, 652, 653 (1931).
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results, on-the ground that there was no evidence of any competition
which might be'injured. As to other manufacturers of similar com-'
pounds, Mr. Justice Sutherland did not believe that Congress. "would
have set itself to the task.., of preserving the business of one knave
from the unfair competition of another." As to the medical .profes-
sion, "medical practitioners... are not in competition with respondent.
They follow a profession and not a trade . . .11 No significance was
attached to thQ possible injury to the consumer.
Notwithstanding this case, the Commission has prosecuted a vigor-
ous campaign against false claims regarding the efficacy of various
commodities,-1 but none of the subsequent cases reaching the Circuits
have presented a fact situation wherein the competitors of the re-
spondent could be classified as "knaves." Consequently, the lower
courts have been able to apply the rule of the Raladam case requiring
a showing of injury to compatitors, but generally with different results-
with one important exception, orders of the Commission have been
upheld.19
The exception marks another successful attack on an F. T. C. order
by the Raladam Company. After the Supreme Court had set aside
the first order, the Commission filed an amended complaint based upon
different misrepresentations as to the efficacy of "Marmola" and, after
finding that the public was misled and that there-were honest com-
petitors selling meritorious products who were injured thereby, entered
a new cease and desist order. This order the Sixth Circuit set aside.
Although the finding that the public was misled and induced to buy
by the Company's false representations was not questioned, the Court
could find no evidence of injury to vendors of "ethical remedies which
are advertised and otherwise made known to physicians" because:
"Marmola's sole connection with these distributees is
through the slender thread that each has some relation to
obesity reduction. These so-called 'competitors' are not en-
gaged in the sale of an apparently standardized product as is
the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Co ...
In the present case 'the competitors' approached the treatment
7'"Professions are thus raised to a plane above competition, so exalted
that charlatans and knaves can do them no injury!" M. N. WArxms,
PUBLIC PEGULATION OF COIPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS EITERPRISE (1940),
n144, . 2.
28 See M. Handler, Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over
False Advertising (1931) 31 COL. L. Rxv. 527; ibid., False and Misleading
Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22.
19 Alberty v. F. T. C., 118 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. denied
62 Sup. Ct. 62 (1941); Neff v. F. T. C., 117 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941);
Kidder Oil Co. v. F. T. C., 117 F. (d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Dr. N. B.
.Caldwell, Inc., v. F. T. C., 111 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Capon Water
Co. v. F. T. C., 107 F. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Justin Haynes & Co. -v.
F. T. C., 105 F. (2d) 988 (C. 'C. A. 2d, 1939); Fairyfoot Products Co; .v.
F. T. C., 94 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); E. Griffith Hughes, Inc.-v.
F. T. C., 77 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 617 (1935).
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of obesity from widely divergent viewpoints. We cannot say
that the class who consult physicians about their ailments or
'who read up' thereon, were, or would be, drawn by this
advertising into the class of those who have been deceived by
nostrums held out to accomplish miracles of healing."
2 0
This, then, is the current law as to the Raladam Company: It does
not violate the F. T. C. Act by its misrepresentations because the Act
does not protect competitors selling similar products, and those whom
the Act does protect are not injured, either because they are members
of a profession and not a trade, or because they do not sell a similar
product.
Although the Wheeler-Lea Act specifically removes the requirement
of a finding of injury to competitors, the courts seem loath to avail
themselves of the terms of the new Act. Indeed, the more recent cases
reveal a tendency to find that injury to actual and potential competitors
will inevitably result from the practices condemned even though no
evidence is presented on the point.2' However, it may be that a third
attempt by the F. T. C. to stop the practices of the Raladam Company
would succeed under the terms of the new amendment.
While the Commission's action against this type of misrepresentation
has been quite energetic, a nice exercise of discretion has also been
required. The line between excessive claims as to the performance
of a product and those legally innocuous claims known as "puffing" is
difficult to draw. While there is comparatively little difficulty involved
in deciding when a representation as to the physical nature or ingre-
dients of a product will mislead the public, it is not quite as easy to
measure the justifiable credulity of the buyer in the consideration of
extravagant claims as to performance. However, the Commission ap-
pears to have discharged this task with the greatest circumspection.
Misrepresentation of Value or Price
The first case decided under Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act upheld
an order directing the respondent to cease representing to consumers
that it gave a better price on sugar than did its competitors when, in
fact, the prices were the same, the difference being made up in the
prices of other commodities which the consumer was required to pur-
chase in order to take advantage of the bargain on sugar.2 2 However,
the misrepresentations here used also involved a disparagement of
competitors, and so the case does not constitute a clear holding that
misrepresentations as to price are unfair methods of competition.
In the next case, John C. Winston Co. v. F. T. C., the Commission
20 Raladam Co. v. F. T. C., 123 F. (2d) 34, 38 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
21 Alberty v. F. T. C., 118 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert. denied, 62
Sup. Ct. 62 (1941); Dr. N. B. Caldwell, Inc., v. F. T. C., 111 F. (2d) 889
(C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Justin Haynes & Co. v. F. T. C., 105 F. (2d) 988
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
22 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. F. T. C., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
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was not as successful. Here, the respondent represented through its
door-to-door agents that the prices of its encyclopedia and of its loose-
leaf supplement services were $55 and $49, respectively, but that on
a "special offer" the particular consumer could get both for the price
of the latter. In fact, $49 was the price at which the respondent con-
template4 selling both. The Circuit Court set aside the cease and
desist order. "It is conceivable," said the court, "that a very stupid
person might be misled by this method of selling books, yet, measured
by ordinary standards of trade and by ordinary standards of the in-
telligence of traders, we cannot discover that it amounts to an unfair
method of competition within the sense of the law."2 The same result
was reached in Chicago Portrait Co. v. F. T. C.,24 where a portrait
company appealed from an order directing cessation of a substantially
similar method. The court said that such a method was not unfair
where all competitors used similar methods, and where the product was
reasonably worth the price paid.
When the Commission's order was affirmed in a case almost identical
to the Winston case six years later,2 5 the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari .2  But a later reversal of an order prohibiting the same sales
method by another of the persistent book-selling companies induced
the Supreme Court to intervene and the F. T. C. order was sustained.27
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous court, observed that:
"The fact that a false statement may be false to those who are trained
and experienced, does not change its character, nor take away its power
to deceive others less experienced."
This case has been criticised for disregarding the question of whether
or not the books and services were what they were represented to be.
If they were, says the critic,2 then the purchaser has gotten just what
he ordered and has suffered no injury. But it is apparent that the
purchaser has not gotten what he expected. He was led to believe
that he was getting a "bargain." That he did not get, and to the extent
that he did not receive what he was led to anticipate, he was injured.
In any event, the Supreme Court case stands for the proposition
that a misrepresentation of the price constitutes an unfair method of
competition and upon the authority of this decision and without tracing
23 3 F. (2d) 961, 962 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925).
214 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).2r Consolidated Book Publishers v. F. T. C., 53 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 7th,
1931).
26286 U. S. 553 (1932).
2 7 F. T. C. v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 116 (1937). A
provision in the order prohibiting the society from advertising as con-
tributors persons whose works were included in a former edition, but
were not included in the revised edition of an encyclopedia, was also
upheld. The order was enforced in F. T. C. v. Standard Education Society,
97 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 642 (1938).
98 M. N. WATm s, op. cit., 153.
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the injury beyond that to the consumer, later cases have sustained
orders of the Commission prohibiting false representations that the
consumer got a "special price" by picking the right certificate in a
fictitious "draw,"2 9 or that a financing plan cost the customer only
6 per cent when in fact it cost him 11Y2 per cent,30 and orders pro-
hibiting false representations that the vendor was selling to the con-
sumer at his regular wholesale price,"' or at one-half his regular price.32
In the last of these cases the court undertook to distinguish the
Winston and Chicago Portrait cases, although their holdings would
seem to be obsolete after the decision in the Supreme Court case, mak-
ing it one basis for distinction that they were decided before the
Wheeler-Lea amendment. Aside from this superfluous reference, the
courts seem to have paid little attention to the amendment.
Misrepresentation of Trade Status
Related to the cases involving misrepresentation as to price or value
are those involving misrepresentation of trade status. In the latter
cases, as in the former, the purpose of the misrepresentation is to
persuade the buyer that he can save by buying from the particular
trader. The only difference is in subtlety of method.
And that possible distinction has not proven sufficient. Although it
was enough for the Sixth Circuit, in setting aside for want of public
interest an order directing vendors of flour to cease using the words
"mill' or "milling" in their trade names when in fact they did not
mill their own flour,33 the Circuit decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Sutherland saying:
"... a large number of buyers . . . believe that the price
or quality or both are affected to their advantage by the fact
that the article is prepared by the original grinder of the grain.
The result of respondent's acts is that such purchasers are
deceived .... The purchasing public is entitled to be protected
against that species of deception, and . . . its interest in such
protection is specific and substantial.
'3 4
Thereafter, a chastened Sixth Circuit upheld the Commission's de-
cision that Section 5 was violated by false representations in mail order
catalogues to the effect that the advertiser manufacured its own prod-
ucts,"5 the court explaining that:
"Whatever may have been our previous understanding of
20 International Art Co. v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U. S. 632 (1940).30 Ford Motor Co. v. F. T. C., 120 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), cert.
denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 130 (1941); General Motors Corp. v. F. T. C., 114 F. (2d)
33 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert denied, 312 U. S. 682 (1941).21 L. & C. Mayers Co. v. F. T. C., 97 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
32 Thomas v. F. T. C., 116 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
33 Royal Milling Co. v. F. T. C., 58 F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
31 F. T. C. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212, 216 (1933).
3r Brown Fence & Wire Co. v. F. T. C., 64 F. (2d) 934, 936 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933).
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the line of demarcation between methods of trade which re-
sult in a private wrong and those in which there is specific
and substantial public interest (which led to our decision in
Royal Milling Co. v. Federal Trade Commission ... ), any
misapprehension we may have entertained of the exclusive
character of the tests to be applied thereto enumerated in
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner . . . has now been dis-
spelled by the decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Royal
Milling Co....
Other orders of the Commission directed against the use of trade
name calculated to mislead the purchaser into believing that he is
buying directly from the manufacturer, have also been upheld."8
A very, late case in this field upheld an order directing a book-selling
company to cease using the name "Educators Association," since it gave
the false impression that respondent was a non-profit educator's so-
ciety.8 7
Misrepresentation of Origin
The cases here dealt with involve the use of misrepresentations as to
the origin of the products or their ingredients in an attempt to trade
upon the fact that the purchasing public identifies a source, rightly or
wrongly, with. a certain standard of quality or value.
The courts have uniformly sustained. the Commission's interpreta-
tion of Section 5 as applicable to this practice. Thus, it is an unfair
method to use the term "Army and Navy" in a trade-name, where
the quantity of genuine army and navy goods in stock has diminished
to about 10 per cent of the total stock, 8 , or to state on the label of
perfume, bottles that the perfume was made abroad, when the con-
centrates are blended with alcohol in the United States, 9 'or to use
the word "Havana" in the name of a cigar .made entirely of domestic
tobacco where the public 'associates that name with a product made
at least in part of Cuban tobacco,40 or to describe as "English Tub
Soap" a product manufactured in the United States.4 "1
Section 5 has also been held to be violated where a manufacturer
of automobile accessories used the trade name "Champion," thus in-
ducing the public to believe that his products were made by the. Cham-
s Bear Mill Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 98 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); F. T. C.
v. Mid-West Mills, 90 F. (2d) 723 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937). Cf. F. T. C. v. Pure
Silk Hosiery Mills, 3 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925), holding that respond-
ent has not complied with an order directing it to cease using the word
'Mill" in its trade name until it actually acquired a mill, by acquiring
less than one-sixth of the stock in a hosiery mill and by placing one of
its officers as one of the seven directors of the mill.
3 Educators Ass'n. v. F. T. C., 108 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).38 F. T. C. v. Army and Navy Trading Co., 88 F. (2d) 776 (App. D. C.,
1937).
,9 Fioret Sales Co. v. F. T. C., 100 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).0 Elmoro Cigar Co. v. F. T. C., 107 F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939);
H. N. Heusner & Co. v. F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 596. (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
'F. T.:C. v. Bradley, 31 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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pion Spark Plug Company,42 and where radios were marketed under
the name "Remington," which is part of the trade-name of a number
of other manufacturers who have a widely established and favorable
business reputation." These were not cases of "passing off," as that
term is used previously herein. The manufacturers whose names were
appropriated were not competitors.
But antiquity may give the practice legality. Where the term "Shef-
field" has been so long used in describing an electro-plated product
that the public no longer associates it with the welded silver-plate
product originating in Sheffield, England, continued use of the term
is not an unfair method.44
A case not generically different from those above considered sustained
the Commission's order directed against the use of the terms "Indian"
or "Indian Made" in the description of jewelry, where the Indians
making it used modern machines, since the terms were found to indi-
cate that the jewelry was made by hand or with primitive tools. 45
And in another related case, it was decided that Section 5 was vio-
lated when a rug manufacturer used the word "Lighthouse" in his
trade name, the deception lying in the fact that the public would be-
lieve that the rugs were made by the Lighthouse Schools for the Blind."
Gaming Methods
A recent Supreme Court case. has placed the judicial stamp of ap-
proval on an entirely different exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction.
In F. T. C. v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,47 the Commission was sus-
tained in its determination that a manufacturer of candy which packet
its product so that coins were concealed in some packages, the price ot
others was determined by the figure on a slip inside the wrapper, and
prizes were given to the recipients of pieces with colored centers, was
guilty of an unfair method of competition. Mr. Justice Stone spoke
for a unanimous court:
"A method of competition which casts upon one's com-
petitors the burden of the loss of business unless they will de-
scend to a practice which they are under a powerful moral
compulsion not to adopt, even though it is not criminal ...
involve[s] the kind of unfairness at which the statute was
aimed .... It is true that the statute does not authorize regu-
'
2 F. T. C. v. Real Products Corp., 90 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
13 Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., v. F. T. C., 122 F. (2d) 158 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1941).
"Sheffield Silver Co. v. F. T. C., 98 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
It is not clear whether the deception alleged by the Commission was sup-
posed to have been due to the public's associating the term with the orig-
inal product or with its place of origin.
15 F. T. C. v. Maisel Trading Post, 77 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
46 Lighthouse Rug Co. v. F. T. C., 35 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
47 291 U. S. 304, 313 (1934). Previous orders directing cessation of such
practices had not reached the courts. In re A. L. Douglas & Co., 16 F. T. C.
353 (1932); In re Reinhart & Newton Co., 10 F. T. C. 110 (1926).
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lation which has no purpose other than that of relieving mer-
chants from troublesome competition or of censoring the
morals of business men. But here the competitive method is
shown to exploit consumers, children, who are unable to
protect themselves."
This language might well be taken to limit the rule of the case to
situations where the "break and take" method is employed to exploit
children, but it has not been so construed. In the first subsequent
Circuit Court decision in which the rule was applied, the consumers
exploited were children, so there was no occasion to explore ramifica-
tions,48 but when a case reached the Seventh Circuit in which the sales
were not confined to children, and it was contended that the rule of
the Keppel case was therefore inapplicable, the court admitted that,
"the persuasive argument in the Keppel case was based on the fact that
the consumers of the candy were, in the main, children," but declared
that "where a competitive method employs a device whereby the
amount of return is made to depend upon chance, such method is
condemned as being contrary to public policy."49 Subsequent cases
have sustained orders directed against such methods without regard
to the character of the consumers affected.50
Nor is the range of practices which constitute unfair methods limited
to the facts of the Keppel case. The Supreme Court said in that case,
"We can perceive no reason for distinguishing between the element of
chance as employed here and the element of deception,"' ' - and the
lower court decisions indicate that it is the element of chance involved
in any practice, independently of any other feature of the practice,
which constitutes the violation of Section 5.5s And it makes no differ-
"
8 Walter H. Johnson Candy Co. v. F. T. C., 78 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935). This case also sustained the F. T. C. in excluding testimony of
parents and educators that the "break and take" packages were purchased
extensively by religious schools for resale to children and had a whole-
some rather than deleterious effect on children, and testimony of candy
manufacturers that they had no moral or other objections to manufac-
turing and selling such candy.
"I Hofeller v. F. T. C., 82 F. (2d) 647, 649 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). And see
F. T. C. v. F. A. Mortoccio Co., 87 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937): "Un-
doubtedly the exploitation of children was a consideration in the Keppel
case opinion, but we think the Supreme Court did not regard such con-
sideration as essential to the result reached by it."
50 S.weets Co. of America v. F. T. C., 109 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
Minter v. F. T. C., 102 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Ostler Candy Co. v.
F. T. C., 106 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 675
(1940); National Candy Co. v. F. T. C., 104 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U. S. 657 (1940); Bunte Bros. v. F. T. C., 104 F. (2d) 996
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U. S. 349 (1941); Helen
Ardelle, Inc., v. F. T. C., 101 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); F. T. C. v.-
Charles Miller Co., 97 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A- 1st, 1938); Chicago Silk Co. v.
F. T. C., 90 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); F. T. C. v. McLean & Son, 84
F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 590 (1936).
5For an argument that deception is also involved in all these cases,
see IVL N. WATKIs, op. cit., 178.1-2Helen Ardell, Inc., v. F. T. C., 101 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939),
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ence that the purchaser gets his money's worth in any event, and has a
chance of getting more. "It does not change the character of the game
as one of chance merely to remove the possibility of loss.'" 5
As in most of the other cases considered in this section, the decisions
pay no attention to the Wheeler-Lea amendment. "Break and take"
sales tactics are "unfair methods of competition."
Commercial Bribery
The Commission started out on an ambitious attempt to stamp out
commercial bribery,54 but was early restrained in its efforts by the
courts. In New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. F. T. C.,55 it was held that the
fact that the vendor had given employees of the buyer liquor, cigars,
meals and theater tickets to induce them to buy from it was a "matter
between individuals" and did not so affect the public as to be within
the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In Kinney-Rome Co. v. F. T. C.," no unfair method was found in
the fact that a manufacturer, with the knowledge of a retailer, offered
premiums to a salesman of the retailer to induce him to push the man-
ufacturer's brand, although the retailer dealt also in other brands.
The situation, as seen by the court, was not different from one in which
the retailer instructed his salesman to push one brand because of the
greater margin of profit therein, and that clearly would not be an
unfair method of competition. And, in order to justify the analogy,
the court declared that the participation of the manufacturer in the
practice did not alter the situation because his competition ended when
he sold the goods to the retailer!
Although the court in the. New Jersey Asbestos case had made a dic-
tum to the effect that no form of commercial bribery would constitute
a violation of Section 5,57 the Commission has declined to accept this
obiter construction of its powers, but it has accorded deference to the
F. T. C. v. F. A. Mortoccio Co., 87 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), and
Chicago Silk Co. v. F. T. C., 90 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), involved
sales by punchboard. The last cited case, concerning the sale of hosiery,
is the only case thus far to deal with the use of gaming methods in the
sale of anything other than candy.
53 F. T. C. v. F. A. Mortoccio Co., 87 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
5 4 G. C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMIVIssION (1924), 217; Note(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 799.
1' 264 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). And see Winslow v. F. T. C., 277 Fed.
206 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921), cert. denied, 258 U. S. 618 (1922), holding that
bribery by a ship chandler in the course of sales to a foreign ship was
not within the jurisdiction of the Commission because the transactions
were purely intrastate.
1275 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921)
"7 "The payment of money or the giving of valuable presents to an
employee to induce him to influence his employer to make a contract of
purchase is a fraud justifying the discharge of the employee, and perhaps
the recovery by the purchaser of the amount or value of such inducement
from the seller, upon the theory that it must have been included in the
price. But even in such a case we think it would be a matter between
individuals, and not one so affecting the public interest as to be within
the jurisdiction of the Commission. .. "
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decision to the extent of distinguishing" between cases of "treating" and
cases wherein actual money bribes are given,58 entering cease and desist
orders only in the latter situation.59
In regard to the practice of subsidizing salesmen of retail distrib-
utors, the Commission appears to have defied the decision in the
Kinney-Rome case by subsequently forbidding the type of practice
there upheld. 0
The courts have not again had opportunity to review the Commis-
sion's orders, but even if commercial bribery cannot be condemned as
an "unfair method of competition," it now might be held to consti-
tute "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" within the meaning of the
Wheeler-Lea Act.
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
From the time the Commission had gotten far enough into its work
to afford a record for appraisal and until as recently as five years ago,
the consensus seems to have been that it was a total failure, or at least
that it had not accomplished enough to justify its existence,"' but today
the Commission is generally recognized as an institution which will
play an important part in 'the future business and economic life of
the country.62
What is the reason for this change of attitude? Congress has not
enacted any new legislation which may fairly be said to have re-
vitalized the Commission. The effect of the Robinson-Patman Act is,
in the main, uncertain because of the absence of judicial interpretation,
and the Wheeler-Lea Act has not yet materially affected the work of
the Commission.
The answer obviously is that the courts have changed their attitude
toward the Commission. The feeling of futility engendered by the
8 See M. N. WATKINS, op. cit., 180.
119In re Finishing Products Co., 22 F. T. C. 858 (1936); In re Johnson
Process Glue Co., 8 F. T. C. 518 (1925); In re Reliance Varnish Co., 8
F. T. C. 264 (1924). And see F. T. C. v. Grand Rapids Varnish Co., 41 F.
(2d) 996 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929), granting an order of enforcement, with
respondent's consent.60 In re TwinpIex Sales Co,. 11 F. T. C. 57 (1927).
60 See G. C. HENDmEsoN, op. cit., Chap. VI; T. C. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMnMISSION (1932); N. B. GASILL, THE REGULATION OF Co1'mm.TrnON
(1936), subtitled "A Study of Futility as Exemplified by the Federal Trade
Commission and National Industrial Recovery Acts With Proposals for Its
Remedy."
62 S. C. Oppenheim, in a foreword to a symposium, (1940) 8 GEo. WAsH,.
L. REv. 249: '"The year 1940 finds the Commission securely established in
the structure of public administrative tribunals. Today its critics do not
challenge its existence or the necessity for such an agency of inquiry
and regulation.... ." H. Thompson, Highlights in the Evolution of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, (1940) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 257: "The Commission
is now settled on a firm foundation and has been doing splendid work."
President Roosevelt, in an address of July 12, 1937: "But the dangers to
the country growing out of monopoly and out of unfair methods still
exist and still call for action. They make the work of the Federal Trade
Commission of vital importance in our economic life."
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Commission's record in earlier years was not due to dissatisfaction with
the policy embodied in the statutes defining its functions, nor to the
manner in which the Commission had undertaken to perform those
functions. Rather was it due to the treatment which the courts had
given the Commission's attempts to enforce the statutes. The judicial
emasculation of important sections of the Clayton Act, and decisions
such as were rendered in the Gratz," Curtis,64 Klesner,61 and Rala-
dam"' cases under the. F. T. C. Act, did not forecast a very active
future for the Commission."
But the more recent increase in administrative bodies and the grad-
ual, albeit reluctant, adaptation of judicial doctrine and technique to
this new phenomenon, together with the changes in personnel in the
federal judiciary under the Roosevelt administration, have engendered
a more generous judicial attitude toward the Commission. The effect
of this judicial renaissance has been not only to undermine the sig-
nificance of former restrictive decisions, but also to arouse new inter-
est in the Commission on the part of Congress and the general public.
The course and significance of the decisions is well summarized by
Judge Walker, speaking for the Third Circuit:
"'Unfair methods of competition in commerce . . . are
hereby declared unlawful.' This expression, new in the law,
was intended to have a broader meaning than 'unfair com-
petition' and it was to be determined in particular instances
upon evidence in the light of particular competitive conditions
and of what is found to be specific and substantial public
interest. When the Supreme Court was required to pass there-
on in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., it empha-
sized competition and minimized public interest, by holding
that there must be a finding or evidence from which the con-
clusion legitimately can be drawn that the unfair methods of
competition substantially injure or tend to injure the business
of a competitor or competitors generally, whether legitimate
or not. It is said that the decision provoked serious criticism
in many quarters because it left the consumer virtually unpro-
tected by weakening if not actually nullifying the powers ex-
pressly delegated to the Commission for the protection of the
public and the consumer. Whether or not the criticism was
justified is now immaterial because Federal Trade Commission
v. Royal Milling Co. et al and Federal Trade Commission v.
Algoma Lumber Co. paved the way for Federal Trade Com-
mission v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., wherein the court rec-
ognized the, Commission's jurisdiction in cases of unfair trad-
" F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920), discussed at p. 26, supra.
"IF. T. C. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923), discussed at
pp. 16, 27, supra.61 F. T. C. v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19 (1929), discussed at pp. 9, 34, supra.
66 F. T. C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931), discussed at p. 87 supra.
6?J. A. McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1933),
692: "But insofar as the Commission is a failure, courts have overlooked
few reasonable opportunities to contribute to that result."
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ing, regardless of whether or not it is the public in general or
a particular class of competitors whose interest demands the
suppression of the practices complained of. This recognition
of public interest was approved by Congress in 1938 with the
enactment of the Wheeler-Lea Act, the pertinent part of which
reads: 'Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful.' The failure to mention competition in the
later phrase shows a legislative intent to remove the procedur-
al requirement set up in the Raladam case and the Commis-
sion can now center its attention on the direct protection of
the consumer where formerly it could protect him only in-
directly through the protection of the competitor." 6
All this seems as it should be. The expertise, the specialization, and
the broad powers of inquiry unhampered by a traditionally formal-
ized procedure, which characterize administrative bodies generally,
commend the vesting of such powers of consumer protection, now
recognized as a necessary and desirable function of government, in
an agency such as the Federal Trade Commission.
The view has been expressed by Mr. Thurman Arnold that the
Commission cannot "act as the spearhead of a drive to maintain a
free market for consumers" because of "a traditional deep seated atti-
tude against trusting administrative tribunals with power except in
very narrow fields." And the formula of the Sherman Act is like the
formula of due process-it covers every field. Only courts are qual-
ified to work with such formulae. 69
True, the above-mentioned "deep-seated attitude" still seems to
prevail with many business men as well as many members of the legal
profession. But, insofar as this attitude has hampered the Commission
in the past, the recent change of judicial temper indicates a minimiz-
ing of this difficulty. This same change, moreover, is both a symptom
and a contributing cause of increasing public confidence in the ad-
ministrative process.
8 Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., v. F. T. C., 122 F. (2d) 158, 160
(C. C. A. 3d, 1941). To the cases herein mentioned should be added the
recent decisions in Fashion Originators' Guild v. F. T. C., 313 U. S. 457,
668 (1941), and Millinery Creators' Guild v. F. T. C., 312 U. S. 469 (1941),
sustaining the Commission's determination that Section 5 of the F. T. C.
Act is violated when manufacturers combine to boycott all retailers deal-
ing with any manufacturer who has copied the styles of the respondents.
While the respondents occupied a strong position in the market, they fell
far short of having a monopoly-in the Fashion Originators' case, at least,
they did considerably less than 50 per cent of the business in the field.
But the Supreme Court based its decisions on the ground that the conduct
condemned was violative of the policy of the Sherman Act and the tying
clause provisions in Section 3 of the Clayton Act. These decisions seem
necessarily to repudiate the approach of the Gratz case, discussed at p. 26,
supra, and to clear the way for renewed action against tying clause prac-
tices.
49 THumA N. ARNOLD, THE Bo rL cKs or BusiNEss (1940), 99 et seq.
1942]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Federal Trade Commission was not designed to enforce, ex-
cept in a narrow sense, the "broad fundamental principles" of the
Sherman Act. Its function is to prevent various specific trade practices
which are contrary to those principles; it is not the sole, or even the
chief agency for the enforcement of the Act. That it is capable of oper-
ating on this narrower plane, Mr. Arnold admits.70 And the Commission
may well act as the "spearhead" of protection of competition and the
consumer in the more immediate sense, even though it may not be able
to penetrate every existing defect at one thrust.
Nor is Mr. Arnold's case for the superior qualifications of the
courts entirely convincing. The essence of the argument is that en-
forcement of law through the courts is better than enforcement through
administrative bodies because the former command "overwhelming
prestige and respect" and that this attitude is due to our use of the
court "to symbolize an ideal of impersonal justice." But attitudes are
changing in the direction of according more favorable recognition to
the administrative process rather than in the direction of increasiig
judicial prestige. Furthermore, the existence of any compelling feeling
of respect for the courts as symbols of impersonal justice in the minds
of actual or potential violators of the anti-trust laws can hardly be
taken for granted.
Now that the judicial obstacles to the Commission's work seem to
be vanishing, or at least decreasing, it becomes particularly pertinent
to consider other difficulties that should be removed. The time is ripe
for the remedying of defects in the administrative process of the
Commission and in the statutes upon which the power of the Commis-
sion is based.
There appears to be no fundamental fault in the Commission's pro-
cedure. It was recently examined by a learned body of administrative
lawyers and their criticisms and suggestions were few."- The Commis-
sion was criticized for insisting that it give its personal consideration
to every recommendation for disposition of cases, to every settlement
by stipulation, to every stipulation of facts, to every request by the
respondent for subpoenas duces tecum, to interlocutory appeals from
the trial examiner's rulings on questions of evidence, and to every un-
contested case. It was suggested that these functions could all be
delegated to subordinates and that the Commission could use the time
so saved to prepare its own findings and conclusions of law (instead of
having them prepared and submitted to the Commission by the
trial examiner, who has not heard the oral arguments and usually has
70 Ibid., 100: "On narrower lines the Federal Trade Commission has
been able to work effectively. Its positive action on trade practices has
been effective."
"'Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, mono-
graph No. 6, The Federal Trade Commission.
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not participated in the Commission's deliberations) aiid to give" more
attention to the form and content of its written decisions.72 These
are primarily matters to be remedied by the Commission itself, though
it might be encouraged to make the suggested delegations of authority
by the enactment of an enabling statute and could be required by
statute to make its own findings and conclusions.
On the score of appellate procedure, the provisions of the Wheeler-
Lea Act should be extended to cover cases arising under the Clayton
Act.
Statutory correction of the judicial usurpation of determination of
public interest in the issuance of a complaint seems unnecessary since
the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act. That Act having established a
policy of consumer protection, there should be no repetition of decisions
like those in the Klesner and Raladam cases, even though the courts
continue to review the question of public interest in prosecutions under
the F. T. C. Act.
But there is room for statutory improvement in the substantive law
in other respects. A clearer definition of the elements of competition
to be protected by subdivision (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, or
perhaps the elimination of any reference to competition, would not
be amiss. The meaning of the "services rendered" qualification in the
brokerage provision also might well be clarified, and subdivisions (d)
and (e) of the Act should be amended to exempt tha type of trans-
action involved in the Golf Ball Mfr's case.
7
8
The tying clause prohibition of Section 3 of the Clayton Act should
be amended to eliminate the present restriction of its application to
tying clauses connected with leases, sales or e tablishment of price,
with a view particularly to bring patent license agreements within its
reach. The tests of effect on competition, if not wholly omitted in
analogy to the brokerage clause of the Robinson-Patman Act, should
be made at least as broad as ihose laid down under the general price
discrimination provision of that Act.
The, Commission has recommended to Congress that Section 7 of the
Clayton Act be amended to apply alike to acquisition of stock and
acquisition, of assets of a competing corporation, without any more
specific referenice to competition, except that if the corporations in-
volved control less than 10 per cent of any industry, or of the sale of
the commodity as to which the corporations are in competition, the
effect of the acquisition must be to restrain competition or tend to
7 2 For an extended criticism of the form and content of these decisions,
see G. C. HENDmRSON, op. cit., Chap, H. I .
73 In re Golf Ball Mfr's Ass'n, 26 F. T. C. 824 (1938), discussed dt p. 24,
supra.
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create monopoly."4 While a similar proposal 5 has been criticized as
an attempt to make Section 7 cover what the Sherman Act covers al-
ready, and therefore to involve the risk of the courts making a Rule
of Reason out of the Clayton Act,76 it would seem that this result
could be avoided by a proper wording of the amendment. And, in the
interest of putting some teeth into Section 8 of the Clayton Act, as
well as for the purpose of giving a broader scope to Section 7, it is sug-
gested that the prohibition of Section 7 be made to apply to individuals
and to all forms of business organizations, rather than merely to cor-
porations.
No further amendment to Section 5 of the F. T. C. Act seems neces-
sary. The Wheeler-Lea Act appears to give the Commission ample
authority to deal with trade practices in commerce, both for the pro-
tection of competition and for the immediate protection of the con-
sumer.
All of these suggestions for new legislation reveal, of course, that
the writer is in sympathy with the general purposes and policies man-
ifested in the existing statutes. They are clearly calculated to protect
the consuming public against trade practices motivated solely by the
desire for gain, and to preserve competition which, again, operates
ultimately to protect the public. That the public needs protection
against predatory tactics of industry will be denied by few. The ex-
sitence of a better method than that of government supervision and
regulation has not yet been established.
And it is no answer to say that absolute "free competition" is a
myth, any more than it is an answer to say that the regulatory scheme
adopted for the protection of the consumer against direct injury or
exploitation is not 100 per cent efficient. Any steps in the direction of
protecting society against undesirable features of our capitalistic sys-
tem are worth while, except indeed in the eyes of those who are pre-
pared to abandon the system itself. Whether many or few, some steps
in that direction are being taken by the Federal Trade, Commission.
71 F. T. C., ANNUAL REPORT (1938), 10.
"See REP. ATT'Y GEN. (1926), 33.
7"J. A. McLAUGHLIN, op. cit., 301 n. 94.
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